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7 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: ONE Staff Memorandum, Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action, 6 February 1967

1. The Board of National Estimates today completed its consideration of the staff memorandum cited above. I represented ORR at these deliberations and OCI was represented by Tom The ONE memorandum was prepared to estimate Communist reactions to the alternative bombing programs discussed in McNamara IV (The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems).

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- 2. The ONE memorandum finds essentially that none of the alternative programs would force Hanoi to negotiate. It does, however, point out that external factors such as the Sino-Soviet dispute, the chaos in China, and problems in maintaining the flow of external assistance could affect Hanoi's attitudes. It also estimates that the USSR might seek to persuade Hanoi to negotiate but would not try to force it to negotiate. Finally, the memorandum estimates that none of the bombing programs would lead to war with the USSR or China.
- 3. The memorandum, in my opinion, fell somewhat short by failing to spell out the severity of the supply problems faced by Hanoi -- particularly after the mining program or the attack on the dikes. Thus the memorandum did not emphasize the extent to which Hanoi's persistence in the war would necessitate a lot of hard and painful decisions about the extent and manner of its involvement. The Board felt this judgment did not require extensive restatement since this memorandum is, in effect, a companion piece to McNamara IV which states the arguments in considerable detail.

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Chief, Trade and Services Division, ORR

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
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